








Secondary sanctions and multilateralism – the 
way ahead 
Jean De Ruyt        
 
The decision in 2018 by the Trump administration to 
withdraw from the JCPOA process, aimed at 
preventing Iran to develop nuclear weapons, gave a 
new dimension to an old transatlantic dispute, first 
related to the American embargo against Cuba: can the 
US force its allies to implement sanctions decided 
unilaterally in Washington, when there is no agreement 
on the reasons why they are imposed? The answer was 
very clear, for Cuba as well as for Iran: despite all EU 
efforts, European companies  with a global reach could 
only abide by the sanctions. I wrote a ‘Policy brief’ for 
the Egmont Institute in February 2019 to attract the 
attention to this issue (1). My conclusion was that ‘If the 
American administration does not hesitate to conduct a foreign 
policy which we consider contrary to our interests – if Iran today, 
why not China tomorrow? – it might be important that we claim 
back the sovereignty we were willing to share with the US during 
the cold war’.  
In today’s context, after the end of the Trump era, one 
might have  thought this problem would disappear 
from the radar; unfortunately it is still there, and 
remains one of the most difficult in the transatlantic 
agenda. Indeed, even if, hopefully, the Biden 
administration manages to find an agreement with the 
other members of the ‘5+1’ to re-engage in the 
JCPOA, the issue of extraterritorial sanctions as such 
continues to need close scrutiny. This was not a Trump 
extravaganza: it is a bipartisan policy which was passed 
as law in 1996 and seems to continue to be a choice 
foreign policy tool by the US Congress.  
The sensitive issue of American ‘secondary 
sanctions’ imposed on its allies generated 
serious tensions in the transatlantic 
relationship when the US left the JCPOA 
with Iran. Some hoped these would ease 
with the Biden administration, but the 
current row about the Nord Stream 2 
pipeline demonstrates that the 
extraterritoriality of sanctions is a well-
entrenched US bipartisan policy.  
 
The EU has made numerous efforts to react 
by developing countermeasures, but these 
have not convinced European companies to 
challenge the sanctions. The perspective of 
enhancing the role of the Euro to reduce the 
dominance of the Dollar in world 
transactions is also still considered a long 
shot. New countermeasures have been 
suggested, notably by the Jacques Delors 
Institute and the European Commission 
has announced  ‘additional policy options’ 
to that effect.  
But the issue should also be addressed in 
the context of a revival of multilateralism, 
which the Biden administration seems to 
favour. The renewed transatlantic dialogue 
and the G7 framework could be used to 
address this sensitive issue, in a context in 
which China’s power aims at challenging 
the US unipolarity - and the EU aims at 








This was unfortunately confirmed recently, with 
European companies continuing to face US sanctions 
for their participation in the  construction of the Nord 
Stream 2 pipeline between Russia and Germany. One 
might have thought that, with the new honeymoon 
transatlantic relations have enjoyed in the last months, 
the US administration would moderate the ardour of 
the Senate on the issue. On the contrary, the new 
administration itself continues to use the threat of 
secondary sanctions as a way to press the German 
government to abide by the US approach.  
This also happens at a time when the European Union 
is trying to reinforce its ‘strategic autonomy’, partly as a 
result of the profound distrust of the United States 
policies developed during the Trump administration. 
From an EU point of view, the transatlantic 
relationship should definitely be revived, based on our 
shared democratic values, but no longer with Europe 
being dependent on decisions made in Washington 
without its agreement. Europe is not prepared to deal 
with China as the Atlantic Alliance dealt with the Soviet 
Union during the cold war. We aim at reorganising 
international relations based on multilateralism; 
unilateral sanctions with ‘secondary’ effects, are 
obviously not compatible with this.   
The Iran case was already a step too far, the American 
administration not hesitating to conduct a foreign 
policy which we considered contrary to our interests. 
Interfering with the Nord Stream 2 project with 
secondary sanctions goes even further, since this 
pipeline does not create any direct threat to American 
security. The geopolitical implications of its 
construction should only be addressed from the global 
and energy security perspective - and for that purpose 





BACKGROUND: THE BLOCKING STATUTE AND 
INSTEX 
The issue of extraterritorial sanctions became a topic of 
dispute between the US and the EU in 1996, with the 
‘Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act’, better 
known as the ‘Helms–Burton Act’, which extended the 
territorial application of the US embargo to foreign 
companies trading with Cuba.  
At the time, the EU was trying to improve its relations 
with the island, and agreed on legislation which would 
circumvent the US sanctions, the so-called ‘blocking 
statute’. In theory, the statute allows EU operators to 
recover damages arising from the extraterritorial 
sanctions ‘from the persons causing them’ and nullifies 
the effect in the EU of any foreign court ruling based 
on them. Moreover it forbids EU persons from 
complying with those sanctions, unless exceptionally 
authorised to do so by the Commission. But, the whole 
issue being based on a power relationship, no EU 
company ever dared to continue trading with countries 
under American sanctions based on this system. Even 
if they were prevented, in principle, from complying 
with US sanctions, they chose instead not to run the 
risk of US penalties and exclusion from its markets. 
After the US withdrawal of the JCPOA, and the 
blocking statute not being of any use, another 
instrument was put in place in 2019, which was 
supposed at least to allow European firms to trade with 
Iran avoiding the use of the dollar: INSTEX - short for 
‘Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges’ - was 
aimed at facilitating ‘legitimate’ trade between 
European economic operators and Iran. It was 
conceived in a prudent way, more as a symbolic gesture 
to show Iran that the Europeans were prepared to play 
their part to save the JCPOA. But it remained of very 
marginal use, and obviously did not solve the broader 
problem of re-establishing European sovereignty over 










A STRONGER INTERNATIONAL ROLE FOR 
THE EURO?  
Partly because of this political weakness, the European 
Commission started to address directly the main reason 
why the US is able to control most international 
transactions: the mere fact that the majority of 
transactions, even when they only involve European 
companies, use the US Dollar. It seems that, despite 
efforts made to enhance it, the role of the Euro on the 
international markets has in fact been reduced in the 
last years. Europe itself uses the Euro as an invoicing 
currency for less than 50% of its imports.  
In December 2018, the Commission issued a 
communication entitled ‘Towards a stronger international 
role of the Euro’, opening a discussion on how to 
overcome the (numerous) technical obstacles in having 
the Euro used more broadly in financial transactions 
(2). On 19 January 2021, the strengthening of the 
international role of the Euro was presented by the 
Commission as one of the three pillars of a ‘strategy to 
prepare the EU's economic and financial system better for the 
future’ (the two other pillars being the development of 
more resilient financial market infrastructures and an 
improved implementation of EU sanctions' regimes) 
(3)  
The recipes are well known: completing the Banking 
Union and the Capital Markets union; ensuring the 
capacity for joint budgetary action in the Euro area; a 
single European seat on the IMF board; cooperation 
with commodities markets to set reference prices in 
euros, etc. One substantive progress has been achieved 
due to the Covid pandemic: for the first time, Member 
States accepted that the Commission would borrow 
money on the financial markets to finance the 
‘Recovery and Resilience Fund’ decided in July 2020.  
But, even if these efforts are necessary to reinforce the 
EU position in the new global world, they do not give 
an answer in the short term to the problem of the US 
extraterritorial sanctions. At the current pace of 
progress, it will take a long time for them to make a 
difference: some Member States have been clear that 
they see ‘New Generation EU’ as a ‘one-off’ measure; 
the Banking Union and Capital Markets Union are far 
from complete; and the suggestion of creating a single 
Euro area chair in the IMF remains, unfortunately, 
wishful thinking.   
NEW PROPOSALS BY THE JACQUES DELORS 
INSTITUTE  
Pascal Lamy, former chief of staff of Jacques Delors 
and director of WTO, launched in 2018 a reflexion on 
the issue of secondary sanctions in the framework of 
the Jacques Delors Institute (4) A new workshop under 
his lead published in March this year a new and rather 
far-reaching ‘Policy Brief’ titled ‘American extraterritorial 
sanctions: did someone say European strategic Autonomy?’ (5)  
Anticipating that the new US administration will not be 
softer on this issue, the Policy Brief suggests a variety of 
moves by the European Union to counter current and 
future secondary sanctions: “Europe needs a combination of 
general protection measures, like the reversal of the blocking statute 
and of case by case countermeasures, such as EU entry prohibitions 
or financial passport removal,” said Pascal Lamy, when he 
presented the paper.  
The ‘general protection’ measures, of a preventive nature, 
would include measures aiming at the reinforcement of 
the role of the Euro (cfr above) but also a ‘reversal’ of 
the blocking statute: the idea would be to shift the 
burden of proof to the country which has issued the 
sanctions; it would not be allowed to request any 
information related to sanctions from European 
companies and EU Member States would be ‘standing 
in for their companies’ targeted by the extraterritorial 
sanctions. Other measures include a ‘European 
Compensation Fund’, freezing and seizing selected 
assets; a European equivalent of the (efficient) 
American ‘Office of Foreign Assets Control’ (OFAC) 
and the creation of a ‘European External Trade Bank’, 
with public law status but funded by commercial banks. 
The second category of measures suggested by the 
Jacques Delors Institute would be retaliatory 
‘countermeasures’: one of the strongest would be to 
prevent American officials ‘who have made extraterritoriality 








territory. Others would be to exclude companies 
registered in the country which issued sanctions from 
the EU’s public procurement market; prohibiting 
access to European Central Bank and national central 
banks loan issues and suspending ‘financial passports’, 
meaning licenses given by EU Member States to 
foreign (or European) banks, upon implementation of 
American sanctions by a bank. As a precursor, they 
suggest that the European Union immediately 
introduce  a complaint before the WTO concerning 
the Nord Stream  2 case. 
ADDRESSING THE ISSUE THROUGH A 
REVIVED MULTILATERALISM  
In its January 19, communication mentioned above, 
the European Commission announces ‘additional policy 
options to further deter and counteract the unlawful extra-territorial 
application of unilateral sanctions by third countries to EU 
operators, including a possible amendment of Regulation (EC) No 
2271/96’.  
It will be interesting to see how much will be retained 
of the suggestions by the Jacques Delors Institute, 
which are the result of contributions by various high 
level experts, but, from a political point of view, are 
rather provocative - and indeed directly challenge the 
new EU ambition to assert its ‘strategic autonomy’.  
Another question is to assess whether the suggested 
‘countermeasures’, even if they are put fully into place, 
will be enough to convince European companies to 
challenge the American sanctions. The real weight of 
the US sanctions policy comes indeed from the 
superpower status of the United States, which is 
sufficient as such to discourage our global firms to 
challenge it. In a way, it is the law of the jungle, ‘la loi du 
plus fort’ which allows the extraterritoriality of American 
sanctions.  
But what would happen if China becomes an 
economic (and military) power of a size similar to that 
of the United States? What if China starts to impose a 
sanctions policy to the rest of the world? The jungle will 
then become a very dangerous battlefield.   
Would it not be in the interest of the United States, in 
today’s world, to think twice about the secondary 
sanctions affecting its allies and to balance this 
aggressive approach of international relations with the 
benefits that could come from a real, genuine, 
acceptance of the rules of the game of multilateralism, 
at the regional - or even, when possible, at the world 
level?  
This question deserves to be part of the new revived 
transatlantic dialogue we are trying to develop: the 
determination of the EU to reinforce its capacity to 
react, based on its ‘strategic autonomy’ agenda, and the 
countermeasures as suggested by the Delors institute 
should convince our US counterparts that this debate 
cannot be avoided.  
A suggestion in this sense is made (in careful terms) in 
the joint communication of the Commission and the 
High Representative of December 2, 2020 ‘a new EU-
US agenda for global change’(6): ‘… we will seek to enhance 
coordination on the use of sanctions including in the pursuit of 
shared objectives, while avoiding unintended consequences for 
European and US economic interests and the unilateral use of 
extraterritorial sanctions’. 
The relief felt throughout the world following the first 
initiatives taken by president Biden upon his arrival at 
the White House is a clear indicator of the aspiration 
from the rest of the world (including Russia and China!) 
to give a new chance to multilateralism: the return of 
the United States to the Paris climate agreement and to 
the JCPOA; the revival of the World Trade 
Organization, sabotaged for four years; the return of 
the US to the World Health Organization, accused by 
Trump of only defending China, and even recently the 
US administration opening to a global corporate tax to 
be negotiated in OECD, all these decisions 
demonstrate that, even for the United States, there is, in 
reality, no valid alternative to multilateralism.  
But the rules of the game have to be respected; the 
extraterritorial reach the US is giving to unilaterally-
decided sanctions is not compatible with 
multilateralism, whether at the regional level or at the 








The current moves in Washington relating to Nord 
Stream 2 do not give very positive signals, even if  the 
prominence given to this quarrel since the first months 
of the Biden presidency comes from the US Senate, 
where the most Trumpian Republicans used it to 
blackmail him over the confirmation of some 
members of its team; Senator Cruz even threatens to 
insert amendments related to Nord Stream 2 into the 
2022 defense spending bill.  
But this should not deter the EU and its Member 
States, together with likeminded countries in the 
framework of the G7, to engage directly with the new 
US administration about the broader issue of the 
compatibility of secondary sections with our common 
aspiration to address the challenges of today’s world 
through a revival of multilateralism – not unilateralism.   
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